Explanatory indispensability arguments in metaethics and philosophy of mathematics

Deborah Roberts

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.001.0001

Explanatory indispensability arguments in metaethics and philosophy of mathematics

Deborah Roberts

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

My aim in this paper is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments for the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from what I call the supervenience objection. A structurally similar argument and objection are found in the philosophy of mathematics. My strategy is to argue that a response to the supervenience objection is available that is structurally similar to a recent response made in the philosophy of mathematics case. My claim is that reductive realists in metaethics, like nominalists in philosophy of mathematics, have to take what has been called the ‘hard road’. And in metaethics, like in philosophy of mathematics, we have good reasons to think that this road is not navigable.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics
Subtitle of host publication	Debunking and Dispensability
Editors	Uri D Leibowitz, Neil Sinclair
Place of Publication	Oxford
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Chapter	10
Pages	185-203
Number of pages	19
ISBN (Print)	9780198778592
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.001.0001
Publication status	Published - 16 Jun 2016

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10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.001.0001

RobertsEEM2016ExplanatoryIndispensabilityArguments
This material was originally published in Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability edited by Uri D. Leibowitz and Neil Sinclair, and has been reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press https://global.oup.com/academic/product/explanation-in-ethics-and-mathematics-9780198778592?cc=gb&lang=en&. For permission to reuse this material, please visit http://global.oup.com/academic/rights.
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Cite this

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abstract = "My aim in this paper is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments for the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from what I call the supervenience objection. A structurally similar argument and objection are found in the philosophy of mathematics. My strategy is to argue that a response to the supervenience objection is available that is structurally similar to a recent response made in the philosophy of mathematics case. My claim is that reductive realists in metaethics, like nominalists in philosophy of mathematics, have to take what has been called the {\textquoteleft}hard road{\textquoteright}. And in metaethics, like in philosophy of mathematics, we have good reasons to think that this road is not navigable.",

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Explanatory indispensability arguments in metaethics and philosophy of mathematics

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Explanatory indispensability arguments in metaethics and philosophy of mathematics

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