My aim in this paper is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments for the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from what I call the supervenience objection. A structurally similar argument and objection are found in the philosophy of mathematics. My strategy is to argue that a response to the supervenience objection is available that is structurally similar to a recent response made in the philosophy of mathematics case. My claim is that reductive realists in metaethics, like nominalists in philosophy of mathematics, have to take what has been called the ‘hard road’. And in metaethics, like in philosophy of mathematics, we have good reasons to think that this road is not navigable.
|Title of host publication||Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics|
|Subtitle of host publication||Debunking and Dispensability|
|Editors||Uri D Leibowitz, Neil Sinclair|
|Place of Publication||Oxford|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Number of pages||19|
|Publication status||Published - 16 Jun 2016|
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- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences - Senior Lecturer
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