Explanatory indispensability arguments in metaethics and philosophy of mathematics

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My aim in this paper is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments for the existence of irreducibly evaluative properties from what I call the supervenience objection. A structurally similar argument and objection are found in the philosophy of mathematics. My strategy is to argue that a response to the supervenience objection is available that is structurally similar to a recent response made in the philosophy of mathematics case. My claim is that reductive realists in metaethics, like nominalists in philosophy of mathematics, have to take what has been called the ‘hard road’. And in metaethics, like in philosophy of mathematics, we have good reasons to think that this road is not navigable.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationExplanation in Ethics and Mathematics
Subtitle of host publicationDebunking and Dispensability
EditorsUri D Leibowitz, Neil Sinclair
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages19
ISBN (Print)9780198778592
Publication statusPublished - 16 Jun 2016


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