Extended entitlement

J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract

The hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which cognitive processes are not bound by skin and skull but can extend into the world, is gaining traction in the philosophy of mind; but it remains to be seen whether mainstream epistemology can make room for ‘extended’ cognitive processes. One constraining issue is that from an epistemological point of view epistemic evaluations should be symmetrical across pairs of cases where relevant epistemic and psychological factors are held fixed and all that is varied is whether the process is extended. We show, however, that in the classic ‘extended memory’ case used to motivate extended cognition, such epistemic symmetry will be prima facie troublesome to square with the observation that biological memory is a paradigmatically basic epistemic source, whereas extended memory appears to be a non-basic epistemic source. We argue that
with a proper conception of cognitive integration in hand this problem can be
resolved. In particular, we claim that extended memory cases, properly understood, involve a kind of ‘extended entitlement’, where the entitlement in question is of the same kind as that enjoyed by our non-extended memorial beliefs.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEpistemic Entitlement
EditorsP. Graham, N. Pedersen
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter7
Pages223-239
ISBN (Electronic)9780198713524
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Feb 2019

Keywords

  • Epistemic entitlement
  • extended cognition

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