Extended virtue epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e., extended knowledge)? It is argued that virtue epistemology, at least of an epistemic externalist kind (virtue reliabilism, as it is known), offers the resources to satisfactorily answer this question, provided that one rids the view of its implicit (and sometimes explicit) commitment to epistemic individualism. Nonetheless, it is also claimed that while virtue reliabilism can accommodate extended cognition, there are limits to the extent to which virtuous epistemic standings can be extended. In particular, it is argued that it is in the nature of intellectual virtue to be directed at non-extended epistemic standings. This point has important implications for an extended virtue epistemology, as is illustrated by considering how this point plays out in the context of the contemporary debate regarding the epistemology of education.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-16
JournalInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Early online date31 Jul 2017
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 31 Jul 2017

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • epistemology of education
  • epistemology
  • extended cognition
  • intellectual virtue
  • virtue epistemology


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  • Extended Knowledge

    Pritchard, D., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Carter, J. A. & Palermos, S. O.



    Project: Research

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