There is an interesting tension between certain value-based deontic theories (such as act consequentialism) and certain value-based theories of virtue (such as Thomas Hurka’s Recursive account). The tension arises in cases involving non-instrumental extrinsic value, for instance the value of sadness in response to tragedy. This tension prompts us to look for more sophisticated value-based deontic principles than act consequentialism. This chapter develops such principles. It argues that the weights of reasons to promote extrinsically valuable states of affairs are a function of the value of extrinsically valuable state of affairs and also the value of its condition. This yields a systematic restriction on the separability of reasons. The broadest goal of the chapter is to exhibit some of the resources available to value-based theories of reasons as part of a deontic theory sensitive to pretheoretic intuitions.
|Name||Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
- extrinsic value
- final value