Extrinsic value and the separability of reasons

Barry Maguire

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

There is an interesting tension between certain value-based deontic theories (such as act consequentialism) and certain value-based theories of virtue (such as Thomas Hurka’s Recursive account). The tension arises in cases involving non-instrumental extrinsic value, for instance the value of sadness in response to tragedy. This tension prompts us to look for more sophisticated value-based deontic principles than act consequentialism. This chapter develops such principles. It argues that the weights of reasons to promote extrinsically valuable states of affairs are a function of the value of extrinsically valuable state of affairs and also the value of its condition. This yields a systematic restriction on the separability of reasons. The broadest goal of the chapter is to exhibit some of the resources available to value-based theories of reasons as part of a deontic theory sensitive to pretheoretic intuitions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Normative Ethics
EditorsMark Timmons
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages166-188
Volume6
ISBN (Electronic)9780191833229, 9780192507860
ISBN (Print)9780198790587
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

NameOxford Studies in Normative Ethics
PublisherOxford University Press

Keywords

  • reasons
  • value
  • extrinsic value
  • final value
  • separability
  • additivity
  • Hurka
  • consequentialism
  • virtue

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