Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees

Rob van Glabbeek, Vincent Gramoli, Pierre Tholoniat

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

We consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby customers of different escrows---implemented by a bank or a blockchain smart contract---successfully transfer digital assets without trusting each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did not require this success, or any form of progress. We demonstrate that it is possible to solve this problem when assuming synchrony, in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a known amount of time, but impossible to solve without assuming synchrony. Yet, we solve a weaker variant of this problem, where success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 32nd ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures
Place of PublicationNew York, NY, USA
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9781450369350
Publication statusPublished - 9 Jul 2020
EventThe 32nd ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2020
- Online
Duration: 14 Jul 202016 Jul 2020
Conference number: 32

Publication series

NameSPAA '20
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery


SymposiumThe 32nd ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2020
Abbreviated titleSPAA 2020
Internet address

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • partial synchrony
  • timed automata
  • liveness
  • distributed algorithms
  • cross-chain payment
  • blockchain


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