Abstract / Description of output
On my interpretation of Kant, feeling plays a central role in the mind: it has the distinct function of tracking and evaluating our activity in relation to ourselves and the world so as to orient us. In this paper, I set out to defend this view against a number of objections raised by Melissa Merritt and Uri Eran. I conclude with some reflections on the fact that, despite being very different, Merritt and Eran’s respective views of Kantian feelings turn out to have something potentially problematic in common: they blur the boundary between feelings and other kinds of mental states.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 379-39 |
Journal | Kantian Review |
Volume | 26 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 1 Jul 2021 |
DOIs |
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Publication status | Published - Sept 2021 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- Kant
- feeling
- emotion
- agency
- orientation
- pleasure
- desire
- intentionality