Fingerprinting Hidden Service Circuits from a Tor Middle Relay

Marc Juarez Miro, Rob Jansen, Rafael Galvez, Tariq Elahi, Claudia Diaz, Matthew Wright

Research output: Contribution to conferencePosterpeer-review


Kwon et al. recently showed that circuit fingerprinting attacks could be used to identify hidden service circuits, which is a key step towards linking Tor users and their activity online. In this paper, we explore an improvement to their attack that uses random forests, which achieves similar accuracy while being more robust to simple countermeasures against it. Additionally, we perform our attack from a middle node, for which an attacker needs less resources and can leverage guard fingerprinting to deanonymize users. Our evaluation shows the attack can be effectively deployed at the middle with 99.98% accuracy.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages2
Publication statusPublished - 24 May 2017
Event2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - San Jose, CA, United States
Duration: 22 May 201726 May 2017


Conference2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Abbreviated titleSP 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Jose, CA
Internet address


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