Fingerprinting Hidden Service Circuits from a Tor Middle Relay

Marc Juarez Miro; Rob Jansen; Rafael Galvez; Tariq Elahi; Claudia Diaz; Matthew Wright

Fingerprinting Hidden Service Circuits from a Tor Middle Relay

Marc Juarez Miro, Rob Jansen, Rafael Galvez, Tariq Elahi, Claudia Diaz, Matthew Wright

Research output: Contribution to conference › Poster › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Kwon et al. recently showed that circuit fingerprinting attacks could be used to identify hidden service circuits, which is a key step towards linking Tor users and their activity online. In this paper, we explore an improvement to their attack that uses random forests, which achieves similar accuracy while being more robust to simple countermeasures against it. Additionally, we perform our attack from a middle node, for which an attacker needs less resources and can leverage guard fingerprinting to deanonymize users. Our evaluation shows the attack can be effectively deployed at the middle with 99.98% accuracy.

Original language	English
Number of pages	2
Publication status	Published - 24 May 2017
Event	2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - San Jose, CA, United States Duration: 22 May 2017 → 26 May 2017 https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2017/

Conference

Conference	2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Abbreviated title	SP 2017
Country/Territory	United States
City	San Jose, CA
Period	22/05/17 → 26/05/17
Internet address	https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2017/

Access to Document

https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2017/poster-abstracts/IEEE-SP17_Posters_paper_36.pdfLicence: All Rights Reserved

Cite this

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title = "Fingerprinting Hidden Service Circuits from a Tor Middle Relay",

abstract = "Kwon et al. recently showed that circuit fingerprinting attacks could be used to identify hidden service circuits, which is a key step towards linking Tor users and their activity online. In this paper, we explore an improvement to their attack that uses random forests, which achieves similar accuracy while being more robust to simple countermeasures against it. Additionally, we perform our attack from a middle node, for which an attacker needs less resources and can leverage guard fingerprinting to deanonymize users. Our evaluation shows the attack can be effectively deployed at the middle with 99.98% accuracy.",

author = "{Juarez Miro}, Marc and Rob Jansen and Rafael Galvez and Tariq Elahi and Claudia Diaz and Matthew Wright",

year = "2017",

month = may,

day = "24",

language = "English",

note = "2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2017 ; Conference date: 22-05-2017 Through 26-05-2017",

url = "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2017/",

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TY - CONF

T1 - Fingerprinting Hidden Service Circuits from a Tor Middle Relay

AU - Juarez Miro, Marc

AU - Jansen, Rob

AU - Galvez, Rafael

AU - Elahi, Tariq

AU - Diaz, Claudia

AU - Wright, Matthew

PY - 2017/5/24

Y1 - 2017/5/24

N2 - Kwon et al. recently showed that circuit fingerprinting attacks could be used to identify hidden service circuits, which is a key step towards linking Tor users and their activity online. In this paper, we explore an improvement to their attack that uses random forests, which achieves similar accuracy while being more robust to simple countermeasures against it. Additionally, we perform our attack from a middle node, for which an attacker needs less resources and can leverage guard fingerprinting to deanonymize users. Our evaluation shows the attack can be effectively deployed at the middle with 99.98% accuracy.

AB - Kwon et al. recently showed that circuit fingerprinting attacks could be used to identify hidden service circuits, which is a key step towards linking Tor users and their activity online. In this paper, we explore an improvement to their attack that uses random forests, which achieves similar accuracy while being more robust to simple countermeasures against it. Additionally, we perform our attack from a middle node, for which an attacker needs less resources and can leverage guard fingerprinting to deanonymize users. Our evaluation shows the attack can be effectively deployed at the middle with 99.98% accuracy.

M3 - Poster

T2 - 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Y2 - 22 May 2017 through 26 May 2017

ER -