Flaws of formal relationism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should be individuated, at least partially, in terms of the purely formal inference‐licensing relations between underlying mental representations. It's supposed to provide a Russellian alternative to a Fregean theory of propositional attitudes. I argue that there's an inconsistency between the motivation for formal relationism and the use to which it's put in defense of Russellian propositions. Furthermore, I argue that formal relationism is committed to epiphenomenalism about singular mental content.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)367-376
JournalThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Issue number4
Early online date16 Jan 2014
Publication statusPublished - 5 Feb 2014

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • Frege's puzzle
  • folk psychology
  • content
  • inference
  • relationism


Dive into the research topics of 'Flaws of formal relationism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this