Formal Analysis of UMTS Privacy

Myrto Arapinis, Loretta Ilaria Mancini, Eike Ritter, Mark Ryan

Research output: Working paper

Abstract / Description of output

The ubiquitous presence of mobile communication devices and the continuous development of mo- bile data applications, which results in high level of mobile devices' activity and exchanged data, often transparent to the user, makes privacy preservation an important feature of mobile telephony systems. We present a formal analysis of the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement protocol, using the applied pi-calculus and the ProVerif tool. We formally verify the model with respect to privacy properties. We show a linkability attack which makes it possible, for individuals with low-cost equipment, to trace UMTS subscribers. The attack exploits information leaked by poorly designed error messages.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherArXiv
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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