TY - GEN
T1 - Four-Round Black-Box Non-malleable Schemes from One-Way Permutations
AU - Ciampi, Michele
AU - Orsini, Emmanuela
AU - Siniscalchi, Luisa
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. We thank Carmit Hazay and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasub-ramaniam for insightful discussions on the MPC-in-the-head approach. Emmanuela Orsini was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under contract No. HR001120C0085, and by CyberSecurity Research Flanders with reference number VR20192203. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the DARPA, the US Government or Cyber Security Research Flanders. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein.
PY - 2022/12/21
Y1 - 2022/12/21
N2 - We construct the first four-round non-malleable commitment scheme based solely on the black-box use of one-to-one one-way functions. Prior to our work, all non-malleable commitment schemes based on black-box use of polynomial-time cryptographic primitives require more than 16 rounds of interaction. A key tool for our construction is a proof system that satisfies a new definition of security that we call non-malleable zero-knowledge with respect to commitments. In a nutshell, such a proof system can be safely run in parallel with any (potentially interactive) commitment scheme. We provide an instantiation of this tool using the MPC-in-the-Head approach in combination with BMR.
AB - We construct the first four-round non-malleable commitment scheme based solely on the black-box use of one-to-one one-way functions. Prior to our work, all non-malleable commitment schemes based on black-box use of polynomial-time cryptographic primitives require more than 16 rounds of interaction. A key tool for our construction is a proof system that satisfies a new definition of security that we call non-malleable zero-knowledge with respect to commitments. In a nutshell, such a proof system can be safely run in parallel with any (potentially interactive) commitment scheme. We provide an instantiation of this tool using the MPC-in-the-Head approach in combination with BMR.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85146665014&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-22365-5_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-22365-5_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85146665014
SN - 9783031223648
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 300
EP - 329
BT - Theory of Cryptography
A2 - Kiltz, Eike
A2 - Vaikuntanathan, Vinod
PB - Springer
T2 - 20th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2022
Y2 - 7 November 2022 through 10 November 2022
ER -