Freedom without Republicanism: The case of Montaigne

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract

This chapter explores the moral and psychological dimensions of the neo-Roman concept of freedom, dimensions that have often been overlooked in favour of a political (and, still more narrowly, republican) analysis of non-domination. Through the example of Montaigne, the late sixteenth-century moral essayist, I argue that neo-Roman freedom is neither exclusively nor intrinsically republican in orientation, that it is best understood as a claim about the status of persons, and that this approach provides a firmer basis for establishing its distinctiveness and value than those accounts, including Quentin Skinner’s, which cast it as a robust variant of non-interference.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRethinking Liberty before Liberalism
EditorsHannah Dawson, Annelien de Dijn
PublisherCambridge University Press
Chapter1
Pages17-37
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9781108956444
ISBN (Print)9781108844567, 9781108948395
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Feb 2022

Keywords

  • republicanism
  • neo-Roman freedom
  • Quentin Skinner
  • Philip Pettit
  • Michel de Montaigne
  • personhood
  • agency
  • non-interference
  • non-domination

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Freedom without Republicanism: The case of Montaigne'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this