From epistemic anti-individualism to intellectual humility

Jesper Kallestrup, Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Epistemic anti-individualism is the view that positive epistemic statuses fail to
supervene on internal, physical or mental, properties of individuals. Intellectual humility is a central intellectual virtue in the pursuit of such statuses. After some introductory remarks, this paper provides an argument for epistemic anti-individualism with respect to a virtuetheoretic account of testimonial knowledge. An outline of a dual-aspect account of intellectual humility is then offered. The paper proceeds to argue that insofar as testimonial knowledge is concerned, this stripe of epistemic anti-individualism leads to a particular account of intellectual humility.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)533-552
JournalRes Philosophica
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jul 2016


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