Abstract
The centrepiece of this paper is Ghana’s Public Interest and Accountability Committee with empirical details of its politics of institutional choice and outcomes. The Committee is hailed as a model of ‘bottom-up’ reform and one of the principal reasons why Ghana is likely to circumvent a ‘resource curse’ situation associated with its petroleum resources. Far from this optimism, this article outlines key technocratic, political and other structural barriers that have undermined the Committee’s profile as a transformative instrument in the oil industry. It draws attention to the limitations of technocratic administrative fixes imposed by in-country and sectoral dynamics.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 313-336 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 17 Jun 2016 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Aug 2016 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- Ghana
- oil
- institutional transformation
- 'good governance'
- extractive industry
- transparency and accountability
- Public Interest and Accountability Committee
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Nelson Oppong
- School of Social and Political Science - Senior Lecturer
- Scaling Business in Africa
Person: Academic: Research Active
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