Googled assertion

Joseph Carter, Emma Gordon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions— made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)486-497
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume30
Issue number4
Early online date5 Jun 2017
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 5 Jun 2017

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • knowledge
  • assertion
  • extended cognition
  • extended mind

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