Googled assertion

Joseph Carter; Emma Gordon

doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395

Googled assertion

Joseph Carter, Emma Gordon

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions— made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	486-497
Journal	Philosophical Psychology
Volume	30
Issue number	4
Early online date	5 Jun 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 5 Jun 2017

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

knowledge
assertion
extended cognition
extended mind

Access to Document

10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395

GordonCarterPP2016GoogledAssertion
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology on 5/6/2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395.
Accepted author manuscript, 746 KB

Intellectual Humility Massive Open Online Course
Pritchard, D.
Non-EU-based charities
1/07/15 → 31/03/18
Project: Research

Cite this

@article{48efdee34dde4b2e9760aecddbeee8ef,

title = "Googled assertion",

abstract = "Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions— made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.",

keywords = "knowledge , assertion, extended cognition, extended mind ",

author = "Joseph Carter and Emma Gordon",

year = "2017",

month = jun,

day = "5",

doi = "10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395",

language = "English",

volume = "30",

pages = "486--497",

journal = "Philosophical Psychology",

issn = "0951-5089",

publisher = "Routledge",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Googled assertion

AU - Carter, Joseph

AU - Gordon, Emma

PY - 2017/6/5

Y1 - 2017/6/5

N2 - Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions— made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.

AB - Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions— made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.

KW - knowledge

KW - assertion

KW - extended cognition

KW - extended mind

U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395

DO - 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395

M3 - Article

SN - 0951-5089

VL - 30

SP - 486

EP - 497

JO - Philosophical Psychology

JF - Philosophical Psychology

IS - 4

ER -

Googled assertion

Abstract

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Projects

Intellectual Humility Massive Open Online Course

Cite this