Government budgeting, power and negotiated order

I. Lapsley, A. Midwinter, T. Nambiar, I. Steccolini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This paper addresses a relatively neglected phenomenon in government budget setting the processes by which budgets are agreed in governments where power is shared (coalitions) or attenuated (minority). These forms of government have been a matter of serious study by political scientists, but not by accountants. This study examines the phenomenon of budget setting in political coalitions and minority governments by drawing on the ideas of negotiated order (Strauss) and circuits of power (Clegg) and focussing on the life of the Scottish Parliament (1999-2009). It offers evidence of stability in the exercise of power in coalition governments and of the fragmentary nature of a negotiated social order in budget setting in minority government. More general observations on government budget setting are also made. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)16-25
Number of pages10
JournalManagement Accounting Research
Volume22
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • political coalition
  • minority government
  • negotiated order
  • circuits of power
  • government budgets

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