@inbook{fe2783941231472aaef885aaa080d8e7,
title = "Grounding the autonomy of Ethics",
abstract = "There are various ways of characterizing Hume{\textquoteright}s dictum that {\textquoteleft}you can{\textquoteright}t get an ought from an is{\textquoteright}. The literature directly addressing this question all focus on logical characterizations of autonomy theses. Such theses maintain that certain logical relations do not obtain between ethical and non-ethical sentences, for instance that no non-ethical sentences logically entail an ethical sentence. The chapter argues that this focus on logical autonomy is a mistake. The thesis so important to our metaethicists is not a logical thesis but a metaphysical one. The relevant metaphysical autonomy thesis maintains that ethical facts are not fully grounded just in non-ethical facts. The chapter defends this characterization, and also defends the converse thesis that all facts partly grounded in ethical facts are ethical facts. This pair of theses can help with debates about the plausibility of nihilism and the classification of revisionary metaethical theses.",
keywords = "autonomy, rounding, Hume{\textquoteright}s principle, logical autonomy, metaphysical autonomy, metaethics, ethical facts",
author = "Barry Maguire",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0008",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780198738695",
volume = "10",
series = "Oxford Studies in Metaethics",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
pages = "188--215",
editor = "Russ Shafer-Landau",
booktitle = "Oxford Studies in Metaethics",
address = "United Kingdom",
}