Group Know-How

Spyridon Palermos; Deborah P. Tollefsen

Group Know-How

Spyridon Palermos, Deborah P. Tollefsen

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Abstract

While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. We start by surveying some of the recent debates on individual knowledge-how and we argue that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, we explore what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then we consider an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, we discuss a potential link between the two approaches.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Socially Extended Epietmology
Editors	J Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S Orestis Palermos, Duncan Pritchard
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Print)	9780198801764
Publication status	Published - 14 Aug 2018

1 Finished
1 Active

Group Knowledge
Palermos, S. O. (Principal Investigator), Pritchard, D. (Co-investigator), Carter, J. A. (Co-investigator) & Kallestrup, J. (Co-investigator)
1/02/14 → …
Project: Other (Non-Funded/Miscellaneous)
Extended Knowledge
Pritchard, D. (Principal Investigator), Clark, A. (Co-investigator), Kallestrup, J. (Co-investigator), Carter, J. A. (Researcher) & Palermos, S. O. (Researcher)
AHRC
1/01/13 → 15/02/16
Project: Research

Cite this

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title = "Group Know-How",

abstract = "While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. We start by surveying some of the recent debates on individual knowledge-how and we argue that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, we explore what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then we consider an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, we discuss a potential link between the two approaches. ",

author = "Spyridon Palermos and Tollefsen, \{Deborah P.\}",

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T1 - Group Know-How

AU - Palermos, Spyridon

AU - Tollefsen, Deborah P.

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PY - 2018/8/14

Y1 - 2018/8/14

N2 - While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. We start by surveying some of the recent debates on individual knowledge-how and we argue that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, we explore what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then we consider an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, we discuss a potential link between the two approaches.

AB - While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. We start by surveying some of the recent debates on individual knowledge-how and we argue that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, we explore what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then we consider an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, we discuss a potential link between the two approaches.

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9780198801764

BT - Socially Extended Epietmology

A2 - Carter, J Adam

A2 - Clark, Andy

A2 - Kallestrup, Jesper

A2 - Palermos, S Orestis

A2 - Pritchard, Duncan

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -

Group Know-How

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Group Knowledge

Extended Knowledge

Cite this