Group Knowledge, Testimony and Peer-Disagreement

Spyridon Palermos, J. Adam Carter

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper


Mainstream and social epistemologists have recently turned their focus on the concept of group knowledge; the idea that groups can acquire and possess knowledge by means over and above those exhibited by individual epistemic agents. We consider this phenomenon to be of central importance with potentially several far-reaching applications. In this occasion, we only examine two of them: 1) We explore the way group knowledge might be related to testimonial knowledge and how this relation provides further insights with respect to understanding the latter, 2) We investigate how peer disagreement should be studied when the two sides of some epistemic dispute are not individual but groups agents.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusUnpublished - 2014
EventWorkshop on 'Deference and Shared Concepts' - Paris, France
Duration: 25 Mar 2014 → …


WorkshopWorkshop on 'Deference and Shared Concepts'
Period25/03/14 → …
  • Group Knowledge

    Palermos, S. O., Pritchard, D., Carter, J. A. & Kallestrup, J.

    1/02/14 → …

    Project: Other (Non-Funded/Miscellaneous)

  • Extended Knowledge

    Pritchard, D., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Carter, J. A. & Palermos, S. O.



    Project: Research

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