Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive from facilities they approve), under the constraint of incentivizing the agents to truthfully report their positions and preferences. We consider three different settings depending on the level of agent-related information that is public or private. For each setting, we design deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the optimal social welfare, and complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Vol. 36 No. 5: AAAI-22 Technical Tracks 5
EditorsKatia Sycara, Vasant Honavar, Matthijs Spaan
Place of PublicationPalo Alto, California, USA
PublisherAAAI Press
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)1-57735-876-7, 978-1-57735-876-3
Publication statusPublished - 28 Jun 2022
Event36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Virtual Conference
Duration: 22 Feb 20221 Mar 2022
Conference number: 36

Publication series

NameProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
PublisherAAAI Press
ISSN (Print)2159-5399
ISSN (Electronic)2374-3468


Conference36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Abbreviated titleAAAI 2022
Internet address

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