This contribution further develops and defends the neo-expressivist theory that Bar-On and Chrisman have defended elsewhere (Bar-On and Chrisman 2009). The core idea is that moral claims express propositions but also motivational states of mind. They argue, however, that this is not because moral sentences express states of mind with belief-like and desire-like components but rather because there are two notions expression that are theoretically relevant to this debate. The first semantic notion of expression is the way a sentence stands in relation to its semantic content, e.g. a declarative sentence expresses a proposition. The second action notion of expression is the way an action can stand towards a state of mind when it communicates or shows it, e.g. an assertion expresses a belief. They suggest that several of the reasons for thinking that moral sentences express hybrid states of mind can be better accommodated by the distinction between these two notions of expression. Their contribution also responds to a range of interesting objections which have been lodged against their positive alternative.
|Title of host publication||Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics|
|Editors||Guy Fletcher, Michael Ridge|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Publication status||Published - Oct 2014|
- hybrid theories
- judgment motivational internalism