Hume on mental representation and intentionality

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Abstract / Description of output

The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, individually, peculiar to representational or intentional things. Second, Hume holds that the passions are not representational but do have intentionality extrinsically.
Original languageEnglish
Article numbere12505
Pages (from-to)1-12
JournalPhilosophy Compass
Issue number7
Early online date19 Apr 2018
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018


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