Implementation and Renegotiation

John Moore; Eric Maskin

Implementation and Renegotiation

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	39-56
Number of pages	18
Journal	The Review of Economic Studies
Volume	66
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - Jan 1999

Cite this

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title = "Implementation and Renegotiation",

abstract = "The paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.",

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