Implementation by Stage Mechanisms: An Introduction

John Moore, Rafael Repullo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The theory of implementation concerns the problem of designing mechanisms whose equilibria have properties which are desirable according to a specified criterion of social welfare. In this paper, which summarizes the results in Moore and Repullo (1986), we focus on mechanisms which are played in stages, and naturally we restrict attention to those equilibria which satisfy a criterion of perfectness. This approach turns out to be extremely powerful, in the sense that virtually all incentive problems discussed in implementation theory can be resolved by using these mechanisms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to) 336-341
Number of pages6
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume31
Issue number1-2
Publication statusPublished - 1987

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