Influential opinion leaders

Antoine Loeper, Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We present a two‐stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1147-1167
Number of pages20
JournalThe Economic Journal
Volume124
Issue number581
Early online date17 Mar 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2014

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