Projects per year
Abstract / Description of output
A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 151-185 |
| Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2019 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- information design
- implementation
- incomplete information
- Bayes correlated equilibrium
- sender-receiver games
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Dive into the research topics of 'Information design'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms.
Sakovics, J. & Visschers, L.
1/01/16 → 31/12/18
Project: Research
