Information design

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)151-185
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2019


  • information design
  • implementation
  • incomplete information
  • Bayes correlated equilibrium
  • sender-receiver games


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