Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete- information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)592-597
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Early online date4 Feb 2022
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2022


  • informational robustness
  • rationalizability
  • incomplete information
  • Bayesian game


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