Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

Gabriel Ziegler

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025

Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

Gabriel Ziegler

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete- information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	592-597
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	132
Early online date	4 Feb 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025
Publication status	Published - Mar 2022

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

informational robustness
rationalizability
incomplete information
Bayesian game

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10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025

ZieglerG2022GEBInformationalRobustnessAccepted author manuscript, 319 KBLicence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND)

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abstract = "In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete- information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness.",

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AB - In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete- information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness.

KW - informational robustness

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KW - incomplete information

KW - Bayesian game

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JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

Abstract

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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