Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem

Wataru Uegaki

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31482-7_6

Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem

Wataru Uegaki

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

A disjunctive belief cannot be described as knowledge if the subject does not justifiably believe a true disjunct, even if the whole disjunctive belief is true and justified (Gettier 1963). This phenomenon is problematic if the verb know semantically operates on a (classical) proposition, as standardly assumed. In this paper, I offer a solution to this problem using Inquisitive Semantics, arguing that know operates on the set of alternative possibilities expressed by its complement. It will also be shown that the proposed semantics for know provides a novel account of its compatibility with both declarative and interrogative complements.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Logic, Language, and Meaning. Selected papers from the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium
Editors	Maria Aloni, Vadim Kimmelman, Floris Roelofsen, Galit Weidmann-Sassoon, Katrin Schulz, Matthijs Westera
Place of Publication	Berlin
Publisher	Springer
Pages	52-61
Number of pages	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31482-7_6
Publication status	Published - 2012

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

disjunction
know-that
know-wh
attitude verb
question-embedding
Gettier problem
inquisitive semantics
aAlternative semantics

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-31482-7_6

Cite this

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title = "Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem",

abstract = "A disjunctive belief cannot be described as knowledge if the subject does not justifiably believe a true disjunct, even if the whole disjunctive belief is true and justified (Gettier 1963). This phenomenon is problematic if the verb know semantically operates on a (classical) proposition, as standardly assumed. In this paper, I offer a solution to this problem using Inquisitive Semantics, arguing that know operates on the set of alternative possibilities expressed by its complement. It will also be shown that the proposed semantics for know provides a novel account of its compatibility with both declarative and interrogative complements.",

keywords = "disjunction, know-that, know-wh, attitude verb, question-embedding, Gettier problem, inquisitive semantics, aAlternative semantics",

author = "Wataru Uegaki",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-31482-7_6",

language = "English",

pages = "52--61",

editor = "Maria Aloni and Vadim Kimmelman and Floris Roelofsen and Galit Weidmann-Sassoon and Katrin Schulz and Matthijs Westera",

booktitle = "Logic, Language, and Meaning. Selected papers from the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium",

publisher = "Springer",

address = "United Kingdom",

}

Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem. / Uegaki, Wataru.
Logic, Language, and Meaning. Selected papers from the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. ed. / Maria Aloni; Vadim Kimmelman; Floris Roelofsen; Galit Weidmann-Sassoon; Katrin Schulz; Matthijs Westera. Berlin: Springer, 2012. p. 52-61.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem

AU - Uegaki, Wataru

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - A disjunctive belief cannot be described as knowledge if the subject does not justifiably believe a true disjunct, even if the whole disjunctive belief is true and justified (Gettier 1963). This phenomenon is problematic if the verb know semantically operates on a (classical) proposition, as standardly assumed. In this paper, I offer a solution to this problem using Inquisitive Semantics, arguing that know operates on the set of alternative possibilities expressed by its complement. It will also be shown that the proposed semantics for know provides a novel account of its compatibility with both declarative and interrogative complements.

AB - A disjunctive belief cannot be described as knowledge if the subject does not justifiably believe a true disjunct, even if the whole disjunctive belief is true and justified (Gettier 1963). This phenomenon is problematic if the verb know semantically operates on a (classical) proposition, as standardly assumed. In this paper, I offer a solution to this problem using Inquisitive Semantics, arguing that know operates on the set of alternative possibilities expressed by its complement. It will also be shown that the proposed semantics for know provides a novel account of its compatibility with both declarative and interrogative complements.

KW - disjunction

KW - know-that

KW - know-wh

KW - attitude verb

KW - question-embedding

KW - Gettier problem

KW - inquisitive semantics

KW - aAlternative semantics

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-31482-7_6

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-31482-7_6

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 52

EP - 61

BT - Logic, Language, and Meaning. Selected papers from the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium

A2 - Aloni, Maria

A2 - Kimmelman, Vadim

A2 - Roelofsen, Floris

A2 - Weidmann-Sassoon, Galit

A2 - Schulz, Katrin

A2 - Westera, Matthijs

PB - Springer

CY - Berlin

ER -

Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem

Abstract / Description of output

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

Access to Document

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Cite this