Projects per year
Abstract
It is widely accepted that one strong motivation for adopting a conciliatory stance with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement is that the non-conciliatory alternatives are incompatible with the demands of intellectual character, and incompatible with the virtue of intellectual humility in particular. It is argued that this is a mistake, at least once we properly understand what intellectual humility involves. Given some of the inherent problems facing conciliatory proposals, it is maintained that non-conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are thus on much stronger dialectical ground than many suppose,including some defenders of this line. In particular, non-conciliatory proposals can resist the idea that epistemic peer disagreement directly weakens one’s epistemic justification, as conciliatory views maintain. This means that the epistemic justification that our beliefs in this regard enjoy, and thus our knowledge, is more secure than conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement would suggest.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Synthese |
Early online date | 23 Nov 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 23 Nov 2018 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- epistemology of disagreement
- epistemology
- intellectual humility
- intellectual character
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Dive into the research topics of 'Intellectual humility and the epistemology of disagreement'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 3 Finished
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Diaphora: Philosophical Problems, Resilience and Persistent Disagreement
Pritchard, D.
1/01/16 → 31/12/19
Project: Research
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Philosophy, Science and Religion Online
Pritchard, D., Harris, M. & Stapleton, M.
1/01/16 → 30/09/18
Project: Research
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