Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z

Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Duncan Pritchard

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

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Abstract / Description of output

The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. Itis argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.

Original language	English
Number of pages	14
Journal	Synthese
Early online date	8 Oct 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 8 Oct 2019

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

intellectual virtue
inquiry
epistemic value
epistemology
truth

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10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z

IntellectualVirtueEpistemicGoodFINAL
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Synthese. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z
Accepted author manuscript, 196 KB

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Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Abstract / Description of output

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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