Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. Itis argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages14
Early online date8 Oct 2019
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 8 Oct 2019


  • intellectual virtue
  • inquiry
  • epistemic value
  • epistemology
  • truth


Dive into the research topics of 'Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this