Abstract
This article reviews the work on Internet security, specifically describing the economic challenges facing information security: misaligned incentives, information asymmetries, and externalities. Information systems are prone to fail when the person responsible for protecting a system is not the one who suffers when it fails. The article then deals with a series of key areas of active research in the economics of information security: modeling attack and defense, breaches of personal information, malware and botnets, as well as payment system security. For each of these areas, the key analytical, empirical, and behavioral contributions are investigated. The article also presents a discussion of opportunities for a research and policy agenda, and furthermore, shows how misaligned incentives, information asymmetries, and externalities are prevalent in online scams, malware, and frauds against payment systems.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy |
Editors | Martin Peitz, Joel Waldfogel |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 21 |
Pages | 572-599 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780195397840 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Aug 2012 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- Internet security
- misaligned incentives
- information asymmetries
- externalities
- information systems
- economics
- malware
- payment system security
- personal information
- online scams