INTERTEMPORAL TRANSFER INSTITUTIONS

J M ESTEBAN, J SAKOVICS

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a single commodity overlapping generations model where, at a cost, institutions can be created (or transformed) to carry out intergenerational transfers. We analyze the game with both strategic and cooperative methods, characterizing the "unique" stationary equilibrium, as well as the set of transfer institutions that belong to the core (which we show to coincide with the consistent core). We conclude that, as long as the creation of an institution is costly, it is possible to sustain positive transfers, though those will be below the optimal level. Moreover, the lower the costs, the more efficient the transfer will be
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)189-205
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume61
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1993

Keywords

  • OVERLAPPING-GENERATIONS ECONOMIES
  • SOCIAL CONTRACTS
  • CORE
  • PLAYERS

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'INTERTEMPORAL TRANSFER INSTITUTIONS'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this