Intuitive closure, transmission failure, and doxastic justification 1

Matthew Jope

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

The transmission failure diagnosis of the Moorean inference is successful only if it manages to safeguard closure. This chapter argues that it is unsuccessful because it relies on an outdated formulation of closure which we have independent reasons to reject, and once a revised closure principle is brought into play, it becomes much harder to see how such a principle could hold while transmission fails. It is first noted that the kind of closure principle typically used to establish the transmission failure diagnosis has, in the recent literature on closure, been shown to be subject to several counterexamples. With a reformulated principle in play, distinctions are drawn between closure and transmission principles for both propositional and doxastic justification, arguing that while it may be possible for these principles to come apart for propositional justification, it seems much harder to see how they could come apart for the arguably more interesting notion of doxastic justification. The conservative account of the structure of proposition justification that is needed to support the transmission failure diagnosis of Moore is presented before attempts are made to develop a corresponding conservative account of the structure of doxastic justification. It is argued that any such account will either lead to failure of closure or else lead to the implausible conclusion that certain types of justified beliefs are immune from bad basing. Either way, there seems to be no viable strategy for safeguarding closure while restricting transmission.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNew Perspectives on Epistemic Closure
EditorsMatthew Jope, Duncan Pritchard
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter1
Pages6-23
Number of pages18
Edition1
ISBN (Electronic)9781003104766
ISBN (Print)9780367610203, 9780367612313
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Sept 2022

Publication series

NameRoutledge Studies in Epistemology
PublisherRoutledge

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • epistemic closure
  • scepticism
  • epistemic warrant
  • transmission of warrant
  • epistemic justification

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  • Introduction

    Jope, M. & Pritchard, D., 30 Sept 2022, New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Jope, M. & Pritchard, D. (eds.). 1 ed. New York: Routledge, 5 p. (Routledge Studies in Epistemology).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

  • New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure

    Jope, M. (ed.) & Pritchard, D. (ed.), 30 Sept 2022, 1 ed. New York: Routledge. 202 p. (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

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