Is a modular cognitive architecture compatible with the direct perception of mental states?

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Abstract

The Direct Social Perception Hypothesis maintains that we can perceive other people's psychological states. Furthermore, it claims that doing so does not require any cognitive process that is simulative or theory-like, putting it in sharp contrast with mainstream accounts of social cognition. This paper contrasts the DSPH against the modular account of mindreading as proposed by Peter Carruthers and H. Clark Barrett. It maintains that the modularity view can respond to the challenges levelled by the DSPH, and that the positions are not as distinct as they originally appear. Finally, the paper discusses the role of non-folk psychological state concepts in our perceptions of other people.

Original languageEnglish
JournalConsciousness and Cognition
Early online date11 Feb 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2015

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