Is having your computer compromised a personal assault?: The ethics of extended cognition

Spyridon Palermos; Joseph Carter

doi:10.1017/apa.2016.28

Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition

Spyridon Palermos, Joseph Carter

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person’s cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to include intentional harm toward gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with critical discussion.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	542-560
Number of pages	19
Journal	Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Volume	2
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.28
Publication status	Published - 21 Dec 2016

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

extended cognition
applied ethics
technology
privacy
personal assault

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10.1017/apa.2016.28

CarterPalermosJAPA2017IsHavingYourComputer
This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of the American Philosophical Association available at : https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.28. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder.
Accepted author manuscript, 293 KB

Extended Knowledge
Pritchard, D. (Principal Investigator), Clark, A. (Co-investigator), Kallestrup, J. (Co-investigator), Carter, J. A. (Researcher) & Palermos, S. O. (Researcher)
AHRC
1/01/13 → 15/02/16
Project: Research

Cite this

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Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition

Abstract

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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