Judgements of co-identification

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract / Description of output

A popular way for irrealists to explain co-identification—thinking and talking ‘about the same thing’ when there is no such thing—is by appeal to causal, historical or informational chains, networks or practices. Recently, however, this approach has come under attack by philosophers who contend that it cannot provide necessary and/or sufficient conditions for co-identification. In this paper I defend the approach against these objections. My claim is not that the appeal to such practices can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for co-identification, but rather that it is a mistake to seek these in the first place.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThought: its Origin and Reach
Subtitle of host publicationEssays in Honour of Mark Sainsbury
EditorsAlex Grzankowski, Anthony Savile
Place of PublicationLondon
ISBN (Print)9781032195308
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2023


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