Kant on moral feelings, moral desires and the cultivation of virtue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This paper proposes to show that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. Certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and moral desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the affective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent’s virtue and his affective dispositions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus
Subtitle of host publicationInternational Yearbook of German Idealism
EditorsDina Emundts, Sally Sedgwick
Pages3-18
VolumeBegehren
ISBN (Electronic)9783110579123
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Apr 2018

Publication series

NameInternationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus
PublisherDe Gruyter
Volume12

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • German Idealism
  • ethics
  • morality
  • desire

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