Kant on the ethics of belief

Alix Cohen

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00375.x

Kant on the ethics of belief

Alix Cohen

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the possibility of developing a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the tools provided by Kant's ethics. To do so, I reconstruct epistemic concepts and arguments on the model of their ethical counterparts, focusing on the notions of epistemic principle, epistemic maxim and epistemic universalizability test. On this basis, I suggest that there is an analogy between our position as moral agents and as cognizers: our actions and our thoughts are subject to the same rational norm.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	317-334
Journal	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Volume	114
Issue number	3.3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00375.x
Publication status	Published - 8 Dec 2014

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10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00375.x

CohenPOTAS2014KantOnTheEthics
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record:Alix Cohen, XIV—Kant on the Ethics of Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 114, Issue 3_pt_3, 1 December 2014, Pages 317–334 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00375.x
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Kant on the ethics of belief

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