Knowledge as ‘True Belief Plus Individuation’ in Plato

Theodore Scaltsas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that what turns true belief into knowledge is the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature of the object. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuation which would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)137-149
Number of pages13
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2012


  • Plato
  • Epistemology
  • Knowledge
  • Individuation

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