Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility

Joseph Carter, Emma Gordon

Research output: Contribution to journalSpecial issuepeer-review


This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)489-502
JournalLogos and Episteme
Issue number4
Early online date31 Dec 2016
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2016


  • knowledge
  • social - epistemic practice
  • epistemic value
  • intellectual humility
  • assertion


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