Abstract / Description of output
According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of
propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b;
Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.
propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b;
Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 181-199 |
| Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 18 Mar 2014 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2015 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- knowledge-how
- cognitive achievement
- epistemic luck