TY - CHAP
T1 - La questione di ἐλπίς, della "speranza" e dell'"emozione" nel Filebo di Platone
AU - Cairns, Douglas
PY - 2024/3/1
Y1 - 2024/3/1
N2 - It is widely recognized that Plato does not systematically deploy a category of ‘emotion’ as such (whatever ‘as such’ might mean in this context). But even in Aristotle, the category of emotion is not as tightly specified as one might expect. This does not preclude our talking about emotion in Aristotle or even in Plato. In comparing Plato, Aristotle, and contemporary writers and speakers of English in the ways in which they categorize and conceptualize the phenomena that contemporary English regards as prototypical emotions we must not delude ourselves into thinking that English has succeeded where Plato and Aristotle failed in isolating precisely those entities or essences that possess the essential criteria for membership of a category that cuts nature precisely at its joints. Though Plato has a great deal to say about the experiences that we no classify as emotions, his discussions of those experiences often focus on properties that, to our way of thinking, at least, emotions share with other forms of experience. The Philebus is a case in point, not only in its discussion of that mixture of pleasure and pain which occurs in the ψυχή alone (a category that is more or less entirely constituted by items that we would typically regard as emotions), but also in its specific uses throughtout the dialogue of the concept of ἐλπίς (often, but but often misleadingly, translated as ‘hope’).
AB - It is widely recognized that Plato does not systematically deploy a category of ‘emotion’ as such (whatever ‘as such’ might mean in this context). But even in Aristotle, the category of emotion is not as tightly specified as one might expect. This does not preclude our talking about emotion in Aristotle or even in Plato. In comparing Plato, Aristotle, and contemporary writers and speakers of English in the ways in which they categorize and conceptualize the phenomena that contemporary English regards as prototypical emotions we must not delude ourselves into thinking that English has succeeded where Plato and Aristotle failed in isolating precisely those entities or essences that possess the essential criteria for membership of a category that cuts nature precisely at its joints. Though Plato has a great deal to say about the experiences that we no classify as emotions, his discussions of those experiences often focus on properties that, to our way of thinking, at least, emotions share with other forms of experience. The Philebus is a case in point, not only in its discussion of that mixture of pleasure and pain which occurs in the ψυχή alone (a category that is more or less entirely constituted by items that we would typically regard as emotions), but also in its specific uses throughtout the dialogue of the concept of ἐλπίς (often, but but often misleadingly, translated as ‘hope’).
M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)
SN - 9788875883836
T3 - Il giogo
SP - 173
EP - 194
BT - Poikilia delle emozioni
A2 - Stavru, Alessandro
A2 - Candiotto, Laura
PB - Petite plaisance
CY - Pistoia
ER -