Projects per year
Abstract
This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry. It is assumed that workers can costlessly quit at any time, while firms are committed to contracts. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment, and show that real wages display a degree of downward rigidity and do not necessarily clear the labor market. Using sectoral productivity data from the post-war US economy, we assess the ability of the model to match the actual unemployment series. We also show that equal treatment follows from the assumption of at-will employment contracting in our model. (JEL E24, E32, J31, J41)
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 98–127 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics |
Volume | 2 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2010 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- E24
- E32
- J31
- J41
- Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital
- Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- Labor Contracts
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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COHORT EFFECTS WITHIN FIRMS, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Thomas, J., Holt, R. & Snell, A.
1/03/08 → 31/07/11
Project: Research
Research output
- 1 Discussion paper
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Labour Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics
Snell, A. & Thomas, J., 10 Jul 2006, Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, 40 p. (ESE Discussion Papers; no. 144).Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper
Open AccessFile
Activities
- 1 Participation in conference
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Society of Labour Economists
Andrew Snell (Speaker)
2 May 2014 → 3 May 2014Activity: Participating in or organising an event types › Participation in conference