Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Labour market monopsony/oligopsony in the UK: Putting labour law to work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Neoclassical economics holds that although labour markets will be marred by monopsony/oligopsony when they are not perfectly competitive, the likelihood of such a state of affairs is vanishingly small. However, recent research is mounting a formidable challenge to this assumption: data shows that labour markets in many parts of the UK landmass and economy are indeed monopsonistic/oligopsonistic. One explanation is that labour markets incorporate frictions that impede labour mobility and costless job exits/quits. The outcome is threefold: wage stagnation, with workers remunerated below the competitive wage rate; heightened inequality; and overinflated prices paid by consumers.
This article probes labour law’s role in generating, addressing and chilling monopsony/oligopsony and its adverse effects; the claim is made that since labour laws contribute towards the embedding of monopsony/oligopsony, their reform is part of the solution. Proposals are then presented for legislation adjusting labour laws governing particular clauses found in employment contracts.
Original languageEnglish
Article numberdwag006
Pages (from-to)1-35
Number of pages35
JournalIndustrial Law Journal
Early online date25 Apr 2026
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 25 Apr 2026

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • law
  • labour law
  • employment law
  • monopsony
  • oligopsony
  • labour market
  • labour market concentration
  • search costs
  • exit and voice
  • exit costs
  • quits
  • quit costs
  • exit Frictions
  • search
  • restrictive covenants
  • non-compete Covenants
  • restraint of trade
  • Restraint of Trade Doctrine
  • confidentiality agreements
  • NDA
  • garden leave

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Labour market monopsony/oligopsony in the UK: Putting labour law to work'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this