Learning in perturbed asymmetric games

Josef Hofbauer, Ed Hopkins

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-152
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume52
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2005

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