Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games

Josef Hofbauer, Ed Hopkins

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2004

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers

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