Abstract / Description of output
In this paper I discuss a particular conception of legal inquiry and how it demonstrate how it can shed light on well-established types of legal argument. I do so (i) by unpacking Del Mar's account of legal inquiry, and then (ii) demonstrating that one common and important judicial argumentative practice (the judicial use of inferences to the best legal explanation) cannot be fully captured within the limits set out by a doctrine of binding precedent and, finally, (iii) showing how a more expansive notion of legal inquiry (like Del Mar's) can help us make sense of that particular argumentative practice.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 170-178 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy |
Volume | 2022 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 16 Dec 2022 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- legal argument
- legal reasoning
- inference to the best legal explanation
- legal inquiry
- abduction
- precedent