Liability for wrongful deprivation of liberty: Malice and police privilege

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Infringement of liberty has long been regarded as a delict which requires to be compensated, but public officers may in some circumstances be protected against liability where freedom has been “lawfully abridged” in conformity with the rules of criminal procedure. However, the boundaries of this form of privilege have not always been delineated with clarity. This article will argue that they remain unclear following the Outer House decision in Whitehouse v Gormley. In particular it questions the basis for requiring the pursuer to prove malice where a claim is made against police officers for unlawful detention or arrest.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)175-201
Number of pages27
JournalEdinburgh Law Review
Volume24
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2020

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