'Liberal Multiculturalism' and the Limits of International Law

Kymlicka's book tells a story of international law. It tells of how international legal developments in the area of minority rights and indigenous peoples and racial minorities constitute a process of ‘global diffusion of the political discourse of multiculturalism’ embedded in legal and quasi-legal norms (pp. 3–4, his emphasis).

Kymlicka's main conclusions are directed at the future of international law. He suggests that an attempt at targeting specialist norms to the distinct needs of different minority groups – indigenous peoples, national minorities and other minorities – has been retreated from in a move back to generalized norms that do little to promote liberal multiculturalism. He tentatively argues for a revision of international law towards a more systematic attempt to target norms.

In the spirit of engagement, this response questions Kymlicka's understanding of international law's means of production and therefore his evaluation of its potential role in underwriting liberal multiculturalism. To do this, I briefly tell a different story of where the international norms he refers to came from, and of what their limits are.