Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis

Chris Ranalli*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it's raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell, in Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell on mind and world, 2002; Turri, Theoria 76(3):197-206, 2010; Pritchard, Philos Issues (Supplement to Nous) 21:434-455, 2011; Pritchard, Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1223-1247
Number of pages25
JournalSynthese
Volume191
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • Entailment Thesis
  • Belief
  • Luck
  • Propositional perception
  • Barn-cases
  • Knowledge
  • EPISTEMIC LUCK
  • KNOWLEDGE
  • BELIEFS

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