Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the relations between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimonial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see several limitations of Fricker’s own account of testimonial injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker’s account that Hawley’s criticisms target, focusing on her objections to Fricker’s proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of epistemic objectification and her characterization of testimonial injustice in terms of prejudicial credibility deficits. I also offer an assessment of the potency of Hawley’s objections, concluding that they do point to genuine limitations of Fricker’s account, but that we can appreciate Hawley’s points without adopting her trust-centric approach to testimonial injustice, or her specific commitment-based accounts of trust and trustworthiness. However, in the last section I examine the positive picture of testimonial injustice that emerges from Hawley’s discussion of unequally distributed obstacles to both being trustworthy and maintaining a reputation for trustworthy testimony in her recent book How To Be Trustworthy, considering how this picture contrasts with Fricker’s account and where it might have important affinities with other accounts in the literature.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Early online date23 Jan 2023
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 23 Jan 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • trust
  • trustworthiness
  • epistemic injustice
  • testimonial injustice
  • Katherine Hawley
  • Miranda Fricker


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